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On the Security of Password-Authenticated
Quantum Key Exchange
Ce´line Chevalier?, Marc Kaplan??, and Quoc Huy Vu? ? ?
Abstract. Motivated by the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) proto-
col, introduced in 1984 in the seminal paper of Bennett and Brassard,
we investigate in this paper the achievability of unconditionally secure
password-authenticated quantum key exchange (quantum PAKE), where
the authentication is implemented by the means of human-memorable
passwords. We first show a series of impossibility results forbidding
the achievement of very strong security, leaving open the feasibility of
achieving a weaker security notion. We then answer this open question
positively by presenting a construction for quantum PAKE that provably
achieves everlasting security in the simulation-based model. Everlasting
security is a security notion introduced by Mu¨ller-Quade and Unruh
in 2007, which implies unconditional security after the execution of the
protocol and only reduces the power of the adversary to be computational
during the execution of the protocol, which seems quite a reasonable
assumption for nowadays practical use-cases.
Keywords: Quantum Cryptography · Quantum Key Distribution ·
Password-based Key Exchange · Everlasting Security.
1 Introduction
In their 1984 seminal paper [BB84], Bennett and Brassard gave the first proof
that the laws of quantum mechanics could lead to an achievement of uncondi-
tional security for classical cryptographic tasks. Their celebrated Quantum Key
Distribution protocol (so-called QKD) allows two parties to agree on a common
secret key which is information-theoretic secret, assuming a quantum channel
and an authenticated (but not secret) classical channel.
Even though this protocol is a conceptual milestone in the quantum cryp-
tography field, the need for an information-theoretically authenticated classical
communication channel leads to a bootstrapping problem. In practice, implemen-
tations of unconditionally secure QKD leave no choice but requiring Alice and
Bob to use a pre-shared short random secret key (to authenticate the messages
with authentication codes constructed from universal hashing) in order to obtain
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2a larger random secret key. Another unavoidable problem is that the authenti-
cation keys can be run out, because either the adversary makes the execution
fail (denial-of-service attack) or due to technical problems (the parties cannot
exclude that an eavesdropper was in fact present). Moreover, when considering
large scale quantum networks, in which secure communication should be possible
between any pair of nodes, the requirement for pre-shared randomness does not
scale well: each node would have to store a number of keys, which is linear in
the size of the network, let alone the problem of key management.
On the contrary, in so-called authenticated key exchange, the two parties
are able to generate a shared cryptographic secret key, to be later used with
symmetric primitives in order to protect communications, while interacting over
an insecure network under the control of an adversary. Various authentication
means have been introduced for classical networks. The most practical ones are
certainly based on either Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) or human-memorable
passwords. The latter leads to PAKE, standing for Password-Authenticated
Key Exchange. PAKE protocols allow users to securely establish a common
cryptographic key over an insecure and unauthenticated channel only using a
low-entropy, human-memorable secret key called a password. The advantage of
a PAKE, in sharp contrast to all QKD-like schemes, is that no authenticated
channel is needed. In the classical setting, PAKE has been extensively studied,
resulting in various secure and efficient protocols. However, classical PAKE
protocols can only achieve computational security, where the adversary’s power
is computationally limited. Thus, it is natural to ask the following question:
Can we achieve a provably stronger security notion for
password-based key exchange protocols using quantum communication?
Unfortunately, even if QKD raised a lot of hope on unconditional security
using quantum mechanics, a series of no-go theorems showed that the dream
of unconditional security brought by quantum communication will never be a
reality for many cryptographic tasks. For instance, several attempts have been
made to achieve unconditionally secure quantum bit-commitments, until Mayers
and Lo and Chau independently showed that statistically hiding and binding
quantum commitments are impossible [May97,LC97].
The impossibility of quantum cryptography was further extended to obliv-
ious transfer (OT) by Lo [Lo97], and finally extended to non-trivial two-party
computation protocols by Salvail et al. and Buhrman et al. [SSS09,BCS12]. In
these papers, the authors show that any non-trivial functionality leaks some
information to the adversary, and that the security for one party implies complete
insecurity for the other. Intuitively, the insecurity of two-party quantum protocols
follows from the fact that the protocol itself allows parties to input a superposed
state rather than a classical one, and perform an appropriate measurement on
the outcome state. At the end of the protocol, one party can always gain more
information on the input of the other than that gained using any honest strategy.
Despite these impossibility results, we answer the above question affirmatively.
Noting that these impossibility results are only proven for statistical security,
3we remark that overcoming the impossibility results on PAKE in a quantum
setting requires some restriction on the adversary. One approach is to limit
the adversary’s quantum memory as in the bounded quantum-storage model
(BQSM) [DFSS05]. Nevertheless, most of the quantum protocols in BQSM would
completely (and quite efficiently) break down in the case the assumption fails
to hold. Instead, we consider here another plausible approach by assuming
restrictions on the adversary’s computational power. Following Mu¨ller-Quade
and Unruh [MQU07,Unr13], we consider the notion of everlasting security, where
the adversary’s power is computationally bounded during the protocol execution
and becomes computationally unlimited after the execution. In other words,
everlasting security assumes that, at the precise moment of the execution of the
protocol, the computational power of an adversary is limited and that certain
mathematical problems are hard. This notion is justified by the fact that the
computational power required to break a cryptosystem might not exist now, but
could exist in the future, and that the protocols should also be protected after its
execution. In particular, everlasting security can ensure the security of protocols
executed today against future quantum computers, when they become available.
Unfortunately, even in this weaker setting, some impossibility results still hold,
so that we first conduct a comprehensive review in different settings: security
models for composition (simulation-based or stand-alone for sequential compo-
sition, universal composability for universal composition), security definitions
(everlasting and statistical), and finally trusted setup assumptions (none, stan-
dard ones such as a common reference string and strong ones such as signature
cards). We show that some settings do not suffer from the impossibility results
and manage to construct, in a simulation-based model, an everlastingly secure
quantum PAKE assuming a common reference string as setup assumption. Our
work builds upon QKD, where the authentication is soly guaranteed by means of
the password.
Related Work.
Security Models. Definitions for security allowing composition are usually based
on the real-world/ideal-world simulation paradigm in so-called simulation-based
models. The simplest one (sometimes called stand-alone) requires the composition
to be only sequential (it requires that at any point, only one protocol invocation
be in progress). Stronger and more complicated models allow for self-concurrent
composition, or even arbitrary composition. In the classical setting, the two
best known security models allowing for arbitrary composition are the Universal
Composability (UC) framework introduced by Canetti [Can01] and Abstract
Cryptography introduced by Maurer and Renner [MR11]. A general quantum
simulation-based model with a sequential composition theorem has been refined
by Fehr and Schaffner in [FS09]. Quantum security models in the UC style have
been proposed by Ben-Or et al. in [BHL+05] and refined by Unruh in [Unr10].
In this latter paper, Unruh also gives a theoretical separation result between
the quantum and classical setting by showing that, in the quantum world, bit-
4commitments are complete for statistically secure MPC, while it is not the case
in the classical setting.
Everlasting Security. The concept of everlasting UC-security was first introduced
by Mu¨ller-Quade and Unruh in [MQU07], in which they construct a (classically)
everlasting UC-secure commitment protocol from certain strong assumptions,
so-called signature cards. Unruh studies in [Unr13] the everlasting security in
the quantum UC model [Unr10] and further extends impossibility results on ever-
lastingly realizing cryptographic tasks from standard trusted set-up assumptions
such as CRS or PKI.
QKD. Despite the apparent simplicity of Bennett and Brassard’s QKD pro-
tocol [BB84], the first complete composable security proof of QKD was only
given in the mid-2000’s by Renner [Ren05]. This length of time between the
protocol and the proof can be explained by the inner difficulty of transposing
the concepts of classical cryptography to the quantum world. The universal
composability of QKD has been first studied by Ben-Or et al. in [BHL+05]. A
thorough state of the art of QKD’s proofs can be found in Tomamichel and
Leverrier’s article [TL17]. Mosca, Stebila and Ustaoglu study in [MSU13] the
security of QKD in the classical authenticated key exchange framework, and
give a proof of the folklore theorem that QKD, when used with computationally
secure authentication (e.g., quantum-secure digital signatures), is everlastingly
secure (which they call long-term security). In parallel, researchers have studied
the closely-related subject of the authentication of quantum channels, the latest
works being that of Fehr and Salvail [FS17], and Portmann [Por17]. This is a
slightly different approach, which also requires a shared secret key. The advantage
is that the key can be recycled: If the message arrived unaltered, it means that
the key is still secured. Furthermore, Portmann proved the composability of his
result in the Abstract Cryptography model.
PAKE. The main approach to construct a UC-secure PAKE protocol in the clas-
sical setting follows from the KOY-GL paradigm [KOY01,GL03], first formalized
by Canetti et al. in [CHK+05] and improved in order to obtain very efficient
results (see [KV11,ABB+13,BC16] for instance). It uses two building blocks: a
CPA-secure encryption scheme supporting smooth projective hashing (SPHF),
and a CCA-secure encryption scheme. Using different tools than SPHF, Jutla
and Roy also proposed very efficient UC-secure PAKE schemes [JR15,JR18].
Canetti et al. proposed another approach in [CDVW12] that relies on oblivious
transfer as the main cryptographic building block and bypasses the “projective
hashing” paradigm. Informally, they first construct a secure protocol for random-
ized equality computation assuming an authenticated channel and then apply
the generic Split Authentication transformation of Barak et al. [BCL+11] to the
protocol that realizes the “split” version of that protocol. Split functionalities
adapt functionalities which assume authenticated channels to an unauthenticated
channels setting.
5Although we are not aware of any quantum PAKE protocol, Damg˚ard et al.
proposed in [DFSS07] two password-based identification protocols in the bounded
quantum storage model: Q-ID, which is only secure against dishonest Alice or Bob,
and Q-ID+, which is also secure against man-in-the-middle attacks. However,
only Q-ID is truly password-based; in Q-ID+, Alice and Bob, in addition to
the password, also need to share a high-entropy key. On the negative side, no
quantum computing power at all is necessary to break the scheme, only sufficient
quantum storage, because the dishonest party could store all the communicated
qubits as they are, and measure them one by one in either the computational
or the Hadamard basis and completely break the scheme. Subsequent works
improve Q-ID schemes and prove their security based on various uncertainty
relations [BFGGS12], or in a different security model, e.g., the computational
security by using the Commit-and-Open technique [DFL+09].
Our Contributions. Our main contribution consists in constructing a quantum
PAKE protocol achieving an everlasting security notion (and thus providing a
password-authenticated variant of QKD). Towards this goal, we conduct the
following study:
– We first study and understand which security results are impossible and which
ones might be achievable for quantum-polynomial-time PAKE protocols
within different settings. We partially answer the question by showing
that, in the simulation-based model, statistically secure PAKE with explicit
authentication is impossible in the plain model. The question remains open
for statistical security with trusted setups and everlasting security without
trusted setups, and we answer it positively for everlasting security with
a trusted setup, by actually constructing an everlastingly secure PAKE
in the simulation-based model, given a CRS as a trusted setup. In the
universal composability model, we show that statistically or everlastingly
secure PAKE with explicit authentication is impossible with standard trusted
setups including CRS or PKI.
– Second, as a side contribution, we improve the framework for the simulation-
based model proposed by Fehr and Schaffner in [FS09] by employing a single
security definition, instead of separate definitions for correctness and security
for each party. Thus, it seems easier to deal with: one can analyze protocols
and prove their security by formally defining simulation strategies. Our
model is simple, expressive and simultaneously enjoys a general sequential
composition theorem. These results are given in Section 4. This extends
the classical framework to the quantum setting, and we give a definition of
everlasting security in that model.
– Finally, using the ideas from the split authentication mechanism proposed
in [BCL+11] to get rid of authenticated channels, we propose a quantum
PAKE protocol which is indeed everlastingly secure in the security model
described above. Our construction is inspired by the Commit-and-Open
technique introduced in [DFL+09]. Our work extends and improves on this
result by showing that a stronger security notion (namely everlasting security
6in the simulation-based model) can be achieved. Lying at the core of our
proof is a simulation strategy that allows the simulator to change the output
of the simulated adversary. In the UC model (as opposed to the simulation-
based model), the environment machine, which is an interactive distinguisher,
externally interacts with the adversary throughout the execution. One very
important artifact of this definition is that the simulator no longer has control
over the output of the simulated adversary. In fact, the adversary is completely
controlled by the environment. This is because the UC framework models the
fact that the real-world adversary may have additional information from the
environment, e.g., from other running instances of the protocol, or from other
concurrently running protocols as well. On the other hand, in the simulation-
based model, the adversary is internally simulated by the simulator. The
simulated adversary outputs nothing, and the simulator is in charge of its
output: it can apply any arbitrary function to the prescribed input of the
adversary. This is safe in the simulation-based model, because the adversary
is “detached” from the environment. By exploiting this major difference,
we show that our protocol is provably secure in the simulation-based model.
These results are given in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
For a set I = {i1, . . . , i`} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and a n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n, we write
x|I := xi1 · · ·xi` . It is sometimes convenient that all substrings of this form have
the same length, irrespective of the actual size ` of the index set I. Therefore,
x|I is implicitly padded with sufficiently many zeros. For a, b ∈ R, [a] denote
the closed integer interval {x ∈ Z | 0 ≤ x ≤ a}, and (a, b) denote the open real
interval {x ∈ R | a < x < b}.
The logarithms in this paper are with respect to base 2 and denoted by log (·).
We write h for the binary entropy function h (µ) = − (µlog (µ) + (1− µ)log (1− µ)).
The notation negl (λ) denotes any function f such that f(λ) = λ−ω(1), and poly(λ)
denotes any function f such that f(λ) = O(λc) for some c > 0. Let dH (·, ·) be
the Hamming distance, and let rH (·, ·) denote the relative Hamming distance
between two strings, i.e., the Hamming distance normalized by their length.
2.2 Security Models
Throughout this paper, we assume basic familiarity with multiparty computation
and associated security models, mainly the real world-ideal world paradigm,
either in the simulation-based setting [Can00,FS09] or the universal composability
framework [Can01,Unr10]. We refer the interested reader to Appendix A.1 for a
brief overview of these models.
72.3 Quantum Computation
In this section, we give a very brief introduction to the quantum notions we use
in this paper, we refer to [Ren05,NC11] for further explanations.
Systems and States. For any positive integer d ∈ N, Hd stands for the complex
Hilbert space of dimension d. Sometimes, we omit the dimension and simply write
H. The state of a quantum-mechanical system in H is described by a density
operator ρ. A density operator ρ is normalized with respect to the trace norm
(tr(ρ) = 1), Hermitian (ρ∗ = ρ) and has no negative eigenvalues. P (H) denotes
the set of all density operators for a system H. 1 denotes the identity matrix.
When it is normalized with the dimension, denoted by 1dim(H)1, it represents the
fully mixed state.
A generalized measurement on a system A is a set of linear operators {MxA}x∈X
such that
∑
x∈X M
x
A
†MxA = 1A. The probability px of observing outcome x is
px = tr
(
MxA
†MxAρ
)
.
A quantum state ρ ∈ P (H) is called pure if it is of the form ρ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| for
a (normalized) vector |ϕ〉 ∈ H. For a density matrix ρAB ∈ P (HA ⊗HB) of a
composite quantum system HA ⊗ HB, we write ρB = trA (ρAB) for the state
obtained by tracing out system HA. We sometimes omit the index of the subspace
that is traced out if it is clear from the context.
The pair {|0〉+ , |1〉+} (also written as {|0〉 , |1〉}) denotes the computational or
+-basis, the pair {|0〉× , |1〉×} (also written as {|+〉 , |−〉}) denotes the Hadamard
or ×-basis, where |0〉× = (|0〉 + |1〉)/
√
2 and |1〉× = (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2. We write
|x〉θ = |x1〉θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉θn for the n-qubit state where string x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈{0, 1}n in encoded in bases θ = {θ1, . . . , θn} ∈ {+,×}n.
We often consider cases where a quantum state may depend on some classical
random variable X. In that case the state is described by the density matrix
ρxE if and only if X = x. For an observer who has access to the state but not
X, the reduced state is determined by the density matrix ρE :=
∑
x PX (x) ρ
x
E ,
whereas the joint state, consisting of the classical X and the quantum register
E is described by the density matrix ρXE :=
∑
x PX (x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE , where we
understand {|x〉}x∈X to be the computational basis of HX . Joint states with
such classical and quantum parts are called cq-states. We also write ρX :=∑
x PX (x) |x〉〈x| for the quantum representation of the classical random variable
X.
By δ (ρ, σ) := 12 ‖ρ− σ‖1, we denote the trace distance between two quantum
states ρ and σ. We call two quantum states ρ and σ trace-indistinguishable,
denoted ρ ≈ε σ, if there is a negligible function ε such that for a λ ∈ N,
δ (ρ, σ) ≤ ε = negl (λ).
Definition 2.1. Let ρXB ∈ P (HX ⊗HB) be a cq-state classical on HX . The
trace-distance from uniform of ρXB given B is defined by
d (ρXB |B) := 1
2
∥∥∥∥ρXB − 1dim (HX)1⊗ ρB
∥∥∥∥
1
.
8(Conditional) Smooth Entropies. We briefly introduce the notions of min-
and max-entropy. For a bipartite cq-state ρXB ∈ P (HX ⊗HB), we define
pguess (X|B)ρ = sup{MxB}
∑
x∈X
Pr [X = x]ρ tr
(
MxB ρB|X=x (M
x
B)
†
)
,
where the optimization goes over all generalized measurements on B.
Definition 2.2. Let ρ = ρXB be a bipartite density operator. The min-entropy
and max-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
H∞ (X|B)ρ := −log
(
pguess (X|B)ρ
)
,
H0 (X|B)ρ := −H∞ (X|C)ρ ,
where ρXBC is any pure state with trC (ρXBC) = ρXB.
Definition 2.3. Let ρ = ρAB be a bipartite density operator and let ε ≥ 0. The
ε-smooth min- and max-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hε∞ (A|B)ρ := sup
ρ¯
H∞ (A|B)ρ¯ ,
Hε0 (A|B)ρ := infρ¯ H0 (A|B)ρ¯ ,
where the supremum ranges over all density operator ρ¯ = ρ¯AB which are ε-close
to ρ.
We sometimes omit the subscript if the state ρ is clear from the context.
Privacy Amplification. Recall that a class Fn of hash functions from {0, 1}n
to {0, 1}` is called two-universal, if for any x 6= y ∈ {0, 1}n and for F uniformly
chosen from Fn, the collision probability Pr [F (x) = F (y)] is upper bounded
by 1/2`. We recall the quantum-privacy-amplification theorem of [RK05] as
formulated in [Ren05, Corollary 5.6.1].
Theorem 2.1. Let ρXB ∈ P (HX ⊗HB) be a cq-state classical on HX , let F be
a family of two-universal hash functions from X to {0, 1}`, and let ε > 0. Then,
d
(
ρF (X)BF |BF
) ≤ 2ε+ 2− 12 (Hε∞(X|B)ρ−`),
for ρF (X)BF ∈ H (HZ ⊗HB ⊗HF ) defined by ρF (X)BF :=
∑
f∈F PF (f) ρf(X)B⊗
|f〉〈f |.
Private Error Correction. Finally, we recall the private error correction
technique introduced in [DS05] and generalized to the quantum setting in [FS08].
This tool allows to correct a constant fraction of errors, by using a family of
efficiently decodable linear codes, where the syndrome of a string is close to
uniform if the string has enough min-entropy and the code is chosen at random
9from the family. Specifically, they show that for every 0 < λ < 1, there exists
a δ-biased (as defined in [DS05]) family C = {Ci}i∈I of [n, k, d]2-codes with
δ < 2−λn/2.
The following theorem, which is a variant of Theorem 3.2 in [FS08], establishes
the closeness of the syndrome of a string X to random, given a random index i
and any q-qubit state that may depend on X.
Theorem 2.2. Let the density matrix ρXB ∈ P (HX ⊗HB) be a cq-state clas-
sical on HX with X ∈ {0, 1}n. For any constant 0 < λ < 1, let {Ci}i∈I be a
δ-biased family of random variables over {0, 1}n having square bias δ2 < 2−λn,
and let I be uniformly and independently distributed over I. Then
d
(
ρ(CI⊕X)BI |BI
) ≤ δ × 2− 12 (Hε∞(X|B)ρ−n).
Proof. The original theorem in [FS08] states for H2 (X|B). By using Jensens
inequality on Re´nyi entropy and means of smoothing, our theorem follows imme-
diately.
2.4 Cryptographic Primitives
We assume basic familiarity with signatures schemes, denoted as σ = (Setup,
KeyGen, Sign, Verify), which are strongly existentially unforgeable under a quan-
tum chosen-message attack, and with commitment schemes, more precisely dual-
mode commitment schemes, denoted as E = (KeyGenH, KeyGenB, Commit, Verify,
Open, Ext), where H stands for hiding keys and B for binding keys. Definitions
can be found in Appendix A.2.
3 On the Feasibility of Securely Realizing PAKE
In this section, we show negative results on the achievable security of Password-
based Key Exchange protocols when allowed to use quantum communication.
We focus on two composability settings: Either a “minimal” simulation-based
security following a real world-ideal world paradigm, as defined in [FS09,Can00],
or the full universally composable security [Can01,Unr10].
Following the literature, we call plain model the setting in which there are no
setup assumptions (such as public-key infrastructure (PKI), common reference
string (CRS), random oracles (ROM), etc.). Following for instance [KLR06], in
which the authors study the connections between information-theoretic security
and security under composition, we consider here the information-theoretic setting,
in which the adversary is polynomially unbounded. Informally, the output of
a real execution of the protocol with a real adversary must be (perfectly or
statistically) the same as the output of an ideal execution with a trusted party
and an ideal-world adversary/simulator. On the contrary, in the computational
setting, we focus on the notion of everlasting security [MQU07,Unr13], which
informally means that the adversary is polynomially bounded during the execution
of the protocol, and unbounded afterwards. This models an adversary possibly
10
saving transcripts today, in order to potentially use them at the time a quantum
computer is built.
3.1 Implicit or Explicit Authentication
We recall an important property of a PAKE protocol: it guarantees that if the
same password was entered, the generated session key is the same for both parties,
but they might not know at the end of the protocol whether it is so. This property
is known as implicit authentication, as opposed to explicit authentication, in
which the parties know whether they share the same session key at the end of
the protocol. In both cases, the protocol should guarantee that if the passwords
were different, the session keys are independent and random.
The line of work for impossibility results that we continue here focuses on non-
trivial protocols1 with explicit authentication. It is known at least since [BPR00,
Section 5] that explicit authentication can be added at no security cost to any
protocol with implicit authentication, using a key confirmation technique. The
obtained key K would be used as the key for a PRF secure for 3 queries, one of
the players would send PRFK(1) to the other, the other would send PRKK(2)
to the first one, and both would end up using PRFK(0) as the final session
key2. This implies that the following results also hold for protocols with implicit
authentication.
3.2 Impossibility in the Simulation-Based Model
Theorem 3.1. There is no statistically simulation-based secure PAKE protocol
with explicit authentication in the plain model.
To the best of our knowledge, no equivalent result is known for everlasting
security or when allowing setup assumptions, such as a common reference string.
This theorem is proven in Appendix B.2.
3.3 Impossibility in the Universally Composability Model
As in the classical case (Canetti et al. prove in [CHK+05] the impossibility
of universally composable PAKE in the plain model), the (im)possibility of
PAKE depends on the existence of some setup assumption. As shown by Unruh
1 As explained for instance in [CHK+05, Section 7], the results are only interesting
for what they call non-trivial protocols, in which two parties agree on a shared
secret key at the end of the execution of the protocol (except perhaps with negligible
probability), if 1) they use the same password and 2) the adversary passes all messages
between the parties without modifying them or inserting any messages of its own.
This is required since otherwise the empty protocol in which parties do nothing would
securely realize any PAKE functionality.
2 A trivial construction of such a (perfect) PRF would be to split the key into three
parts, use the two first parts as key confirmations and the last one as the real session
key.
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in [Unr13], the classical notion of passive adversaries (which copy all data) does not
make sense in the quantum case. He thus considers only unitary protocols, which
perform no measurements (any protocol can be transformed into such a protocol
using additional quantum memory). Unruh then defines a functionality F to
be quantum-passively-realizable it there exists a unitary protocol that realizes F
with respect to passive unlimited adversaries (that follow the protocol exactly
and do not even copy information). The following lemma gives examples of
quantum-passively-realizable functionalities.
Lemma 3.1 ([Unr13, Lemma 8]). The following functionalities are quantum-
passively-realizable: FCT (coin-toss), FCRS (common reference string), FEPR
(predistributed EPR pair), FPKI (public key infrastructure; assuming that the
secret key is uniquely determined by the public key).
We state the following impossibility theorem, proven in Appendix B.3.
Theorem 3.2. There is no statistically or everlastingly quantum-UC-secure
PAKE protocol with explicit authentication which only uses quantum-passively-
realizable functionalities as trusted setup assumptions.
3.4 Avoiding Impossibility Results
In summary, we have shown that, in the simulation-based model, statistically
secure PAKE with explicit authentication is impossible in the plain model.
The question remains open for statistical security with a trusted setup, or for
everlasting security with or without trusted setups. In the following, we partially
solve these open questions, by actually constructing an everlastingly secure PAKE
in the simulation-based model, given a CRS as a trusted setup.
In the universal composability model, statistically or everlastingly secure
PAKE with explicit authentication is impossible with quantum-passively-realizable
functionalities as trusted setups. Unruh shows in [Unr13] that it is possible using
signature cards as a trusted setup (he even shows that this setup assumption is
indeed complete for everlastingly secure two-party computation).
4 Definition of Security
4.1 Description of the Simulation-based Model
Our definition follows the framework based on the real-world/ideal-world simu-
lation paradigm put forward in [FS09] and enjoys sequential composition. The
main features of our model are that it is formally sound, simple and expressive,
benefits from a simpler security definition tailored to various assumptions on the
adversary’s computational power.
Since we are interested in two-party quantum computations, we formalize the
real and ideal model executing the task with two parties and a static adversary
who can control an arbitrary but fixed corrupted party. We only consider either
the setting where one of the parties is corrupted, or the setting where none of the
parties is corrupted, in which case the adversary seeing the transcript between
the parties should learn nothing.
12
Execution in the ideal model. Denote the participating parties by P1 and
P2 and let i ∈ {1, 2} denote the index of the corrupted party, controlled by an
adversary A. An ideal execution for an ideal functionality F proceeds as follows:
Inputs: We fix an arbitrary distribution PU for P1’s input, PV for P2’s input.
For honest P1 and P2, we assume the common input state ρUV to be classical,
i.e. of the form ρUV =
∑
u,v PUV (u, v)|u〉〈u| ⊗ |v〉〈v| for some probability
distribution PUV . The adversary A also has an auxiliary classical input
denoted by Z as well as a quantum state T ′ which only depends on Z, such
that for any honest player’s input W and his classical “side information” S:
ρSWZT ′ = ρSW↔Z↔T ′ . All parties are initialized with the same value 1λ on
their security parameter tape (including the trusted party).
Send inputs to trusted party: The honest party Pj sends its prescribed input
to the trusted party. The corrupted party Pi controlled by A may either abort
(by replacing the input with a special aborti message), send its prescribed
input, or send some other input of the same length to the trusted party
by applying some completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map. This
decision is made by A and may depend on its auxiliary input and the input
value of Pi. Denote the common input state sent to the trusted party by
ρSU ′ZV ′ . Upon receipt of input from the parties, the trusted party measures
the inputs in the computational basis.
Early abort option: If the trusted party receives an input of the form aborti
for some i ∈ {1, 2}, it sends aborti to the honest party Pj and the ideal
execution terminates. Otherwise, the execution proceeds to the next step.
Trusted party sends output to adversary: At this point the trusted party
computes (X,Y ) = (idS ⊗F) ρSU ′ZV ′ and let f1 = (S,X) and f2 = (Z, Y )
and sends fi to party Pi (i.e. it sends the corrupted party its output).
Adversary instructs trusted party to continue or halt: A sends either continue
or aborti to the trusted party. If it sends continue, the trusted party sends fj
to the honest party Pj . Otherwise, if A sends aborti, the trusted party sends
aborti to party Pj .
Outputs: The honest party always outputs the output value it obtained from
the trusted party. The corrupted party outputs nothing. The adversary A
outputs any arbitrary CPTP map of the prescribed input of the corrupted
party, the auxiliary classical input Z, and the value fi obtained from the
trusted party.
The ideal execution of F , denoted by IDEALF,A (ρSUZV , λ), is defined as the
overall output state (augmented with honest inputs) of the honest party and the
adversary A from the above ideal execution.
Execution in the real model. We next consider the real model in which a
real two-party quantum protocol Π is executed with no trusted parties. In this
case, the adversary A sends all messages in place of the corrupted party, and may
follow an arbitrary strategy. In contrast, the honest party follows the instructions
of Π. We consider a simple network setting where the protocol proceeds in
rounds, where in each round one party sends a message to the other party.
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Let F be as above and let Π be a two-party quantum protocol for computing
F. When P1 and P2 are both honest, we fix an arbitrary joint probability
distribution PUV for the inputs U and V , resulting in a common output state
ρUVXY E = ρE⊗Π(U, V ) with a well defined joint probability distribution PUVXY ,
where E is the adversary’s quantum system. For an honest Pj and a dishonest Pi
who takes as input a classical Z and a quantum state V ′ and output (the same)
Z and a quantum state Y ′, then the resulting overall output state (augmented
with the honest party’s input S and U) is ρSUXZY ′ = (idSU ⊗Π) ρSUUZV ′ .
The real execution of Π, denoted by REALΠ,S (ρSUZV , λ), is defined as the
overall output state of the honest party and the adversary A from the real
execution of Π.
Definition 4.1. A two-party quantum protocol Π is said to statistically ε-
securely emulate an ideal classical functionality F with abort in the presence of
static malicious adversaries if for every (possibly unbounded) adversary A for the
real model, there exists an (possibly unbounded) adversary (called the simulator)
S for the ideal model, such that
IDEALF,S (ρSUZV , λ) ≈ε REALΠ,A (ρSUZV , λ) ,
where S,Z ∈ {0, 1}∗ and λ ∈ N.
We also give here an adapted definition of everlasting security in the simulation-
based paradigm. The execution in the ideal model and the real model stays the
same as for unconditional security, but we require that the real-world adversary
and ideal-world adversary are computationally bounded.
Definition 4.2. A two-party quantum protocol Π is said to everlastingly ε-
securely emulate an ideal classical functionality F with abort in the presence of
static malicious adversaries if for every quantum-polynomial-time adversary A
for the real model, there exists a quantum-polynomial-time adversary (called the
simulator) S for the ideal model, such that
IDEALF,S (ρSUZV , λ) ≈ε REALΠ,A (ρSUZV , λ) ,
where S,Z ∈ {0, 1}∗ and λ ∈ N.
4.2 Split Authentication: From Passive Security to Active Security
A common approach in designing multi-party quantum cryptographic protocols
is to treat the authenticated communication aspect of the problem as extraneous
to the actual protocol design. That is, the adversary is assumed to be unable to
send classical messages in the name of uncorrupted parties, or modify classical
messages that the uncorrupted parties send to each other. This means that
authentication must be provided by some mechanism that is external to the
protocol itself, such as classical authenticated channels, as in QKD.
On the contrary, it makes no sense to rely on authenticated channels for
realizing authenticated key-exchange, such as PAKE. But in the absence of such
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strong authentication mechanisms, honest parties cannot distinguish the case in
which they interact with each other from the case in which they interact with
the adversary, so that the adversary can always partition the players and engage
in separate executions of the protocols with each of them, playing the role of the
other player.
To overcome this difficulty, our approach is to follow the Split Authentication
transformation of [BCL+11]: We consider a completely unauthenticated setting,
where all classical messages sent by the parties may be tampered with and
modified by the adversary without the uncorrupted parties being able to detect
this fact. Then we modify the protocol as described on Figure 1: We add an extra
first flow in which the players exchange public verification keys for a signature
scheme, and check these values by exchanging signatures on these keys. Each
classical flow of the subsequent protocol is then signed using the associated private
signing key, and verified by the other player, who aborts in case it does not match.
This transformation implies that the only attack that the adversary can carry
out is to completely “disconnect” the two uncorrupted parties (during the added
first flow), and engage in completely separate executions with each one of the
two parties, where in each execution the adversary plays the role of the other
party. Intuitively, the transformation guarantees that the adversary is limited to
pursuing one of the two following strategies:
1. Passive attacks: In this strategy, the adversary does not tamper with the
first flow, so that it can only carry out active attacks on the quantum part
of the channel, but it cannot carry active attacks on the classical channel
without being caught.
2. Independent executions: In this strategy, the adversary intercepts the first
flows between the parties and engages in independent, separate executions
with each of them. We note that, in our simulation-based model, the adversary
can only run one execution at any point. Then, the security is exactly the
same as in the case where one of the parties is corrupted.
Theorem 4.1. Assume the existence of signature schemes that are existentially
unforgeable under an adaptive quantum chosen message attack (see definitions
in A.2). Let Π be a two-party quantum protocol that is everlastingly secure in
the authenticated-channel setting. Then, the compiled protocol Cεsig (Π), resulting
by applying the transformation given in Figure 1, is everlastingly secure against
static, malicious adversaries, according to Definition 4.2, with no authenticated
channels.
The proof works almost the same as the proof given in [BCL+11], and is given
in Appendix C.
5 Our Protocol
High-Level Description. We use the split authentication mechanism given in
Section 4.2, so that we focus on the “inner” protocol construction, which is a
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Link Initialization
Upon activation, Pb does the followings:
1. Pb chooses a key pair (skb, vkb) for the signature scheme.
2. Pb sends vkb to P1−b. (Recall that in an unauthenticated network, sending m
to Pi only means that the message is given to the adversary.)
3. Pb waits until it receives a key from P1−b (Recall that this key is actually received
from the adversary and does not necessarily correspond to the key sent by the
other party.) and defines sidb = 〈(P0, vk0) , (P1, vk1)〉.
4. Pb computes σb = Sign (sidb) and sends (sidb, σb) to P1−b.
5. Pb waits until it receives a message (sid, σ) from P1−b. Then it checks that
Verifyvk1−b(sid, σ) = 1 and that sidb = sid. If all of these check pass, then Pb
outputs sidb.
Core Protocol Execution
1. Pb initializes a counter c to zero.
2. Pb runs protocol Π according to the protocol specification, with some slight
modifications for classical messages authentication:
(a) When Pb wants to send a classical message m to P1−b, it signs on m together
with sidb, the recipient identity, and the counter value. That is, Pb computes
σ = Signskb(sidi,m, P1−b, c), sends (Pb,m, c, σ) to P1−b and increments c.
(b) Upon receiving a message (P,m, c, σ) allegedly from P1−b, Pb first verifies
that c did not appear in a message received from P1−b in the past. It then
verifies that σ is a valid signature on (sidb,m, P, c) using the verification
key vk1−b. If the verification fails, it halts.
Fig. 1. Compiled protocol Cεsig (Π).
quantum PAKE assuming authenticated classical channels (which means that
the adversary is assumed to be unable to modify classical messages sent by the
uncorrupted parties). Applying the transformation described in Figure 1 (using
digital signatures) will thus lead to a quantum PAKE where the authentication
between two honest parties is solely guaranteed by the password.
The full description of our PAKE protocol is provided in Figure 2 and its
schematic diagram is given in Figure 3. From a high point of view, it starts with
a preparation phase, in which the client samples random binary strings x and θ,
and sends the encoded quantum state of x using basis θ. Next, a parameter
estimation phase is done by means of a dual-mode commitment scheme, which
can be either perfectly hiding or perfectly binding, depending on the chosen
commitment key (see details in Appendix A.2). The main difference between the
security of a PAKE protocol and QKD is the need to consider the cases where one
of the parties is corrupted. Two-party quantum protocols can easily be broken
by the adversary purification attack: the dishonest party can purify his actions
at the expense of additional quantum memory, and delay the measurements
until the other party reveals her chosen basis at a later stage, and learn more
information than what he was supposed to. In order to enforce honest behavior,
we use the Commit-and-Open compiler formally introduced in [DFL+09], and
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apply it to both parties. This forces both parties to measure by asking them to
commit to all the basis choices and measurement results, and open some of them
later.
After the estimation phase, both parties exchange a one-time pad of their
password encrypted using the chosen random basis. We show that the session
keys of both parties at the end are random and independent for any pair of
different passwords.
Finally, the post-processing phase consists, as QKD, of error correcting and
privacy amplification. A new problem lies, however, in the error correcting step:
to correct the errors caused by either the adversary or the imperfection of the
quantum channel, one party may send a syndrome of the generated secret key to
allow the other party to recover the same key from its noisy version. However, the
syndrome may give extra information to a dishonest party. To circumvent this
problem, we employ the δ-biased linear binary codes introduced in [DS05], which
has an additional property that the syndrome of a string with high min-entropy
is close to uniform.
Notations and Building Blocks. Let λ denote the security parameter and let
k = poly(λ) and some α ∈ (0, 1). Assume that both parties share some password
pw ∈ D ⊆ {0, 1}m. We denote:
– c : D → {+,×}n the encoding function of a binary code of length n with
m = |D| codewords and minimal distance d. c is chosen such that n is linear
in log (m) or larger, and d is linear in n, i.e. d := γn, for some constant γ.
– F a strongly two-universal class of hash functions from {0, 1}` to {0, 1}λ for
some parameter ` = n/2.
–
{
syndj
}
j∈J the family of syndrome functions corresponding to a δ-biased
family C = {Cj}j∈J of linear error correcting codes of size ` = n/2, where
δ < 2−βn/4, for some constant 0 < β < 1. Let {decodej}j∈J be the
corresponding decoding function. A random Cj allows to efficiently correct a
τ -fraction of errors for some constant τ > 0.
– E a dual-mode proof commitment scheme, and we denote c← E .Commit (m)
an execution of the commit phase of a message m (with some randomness).
We assume that the opening phase consists in the sender sending m (and
some randomness used in the commit phase) and the receiver verifying via a
deterministic function E .Verify (c,m).
Security Result.
Theorem 5.1. The protocol Π of Figure 2 is everlastingly secure, in the FCRS-
hybrid model, assuming authenticated classical channels.
Proof Sketch.
No corrupted parties. We highlight some commons and differences between our
protocol and QKD protocol as follows.
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Common reference string: A pair (ck, ck′), which are the two perfectly hiding
commitment keys for the dual-mode proof commitment scheme E .
Protocol Steps:
1. Upon activation, P1 chooses x←$ {0, 1}k, θ←$ {+,×}k, encodes each data bit
from x according to the corresponding basis bit θ, let the encoded state be |Ψ〉
and sends flow− zero = |Ψ〉 to P2.
2. Upon receipt of flow− zero from P1, P2 chooses θˆ←$ {+,×}k, measures |Ψ〉
in basis θˆ to get a classical string xˆ. For each pair of bits of xˆ and θˆ, it uses
ck to commit (c0i , c
1
i ) = (E .Commit(xˆi), E .Commit(θˆi)), then sends flow− one1 ={
(c0i , c
1
i )
}
i∈[k] to P1.
3. Upon receipt of flow− one1 from P2, P1 chooses a random subset T1 ⊂R
{1, . . . , k} such that |T1| = αk, and sends flow− one2 = T1 to P2.
4. Upon receipt of flow− one2 from P1, P2 opens all the commitments restricted
to the indices i ∈ T1 and sends flow− one3 =
{
xˆi, θˆi | i ∈ T1
}
to P1.
5. Upon receipt of flow− one3 from P2, P1 verifies all the commitments restricted
to the indices i ∈ T1: E .Verify(c0i , xˆi) ?= 1 and E .Verify(c1i , θˆi) ?= 1. Further-
more, it sets T ′1 =
{
i ∈ T1 | θi = θˆi
}
and verifies that rH
(
x|T ′1 , xˆ|T ′1
)
≤ τ
2
. It
aborts if the verifications fail.
For each pair of bits of x and θ restricted to the set {1, . . . , k} \ T1, it uses ck′
to commit (c0i , c
1
i ) = (E .Commit(xi), E .Commit(θi)), then sends flow− two1 ={
(c0i , c
1
i )
}
i∈[k1] to P2, where k1 = k − αk.
6. Upon receipt of flow− two1 from P1, P2 chooses a random subset T2 ⊂R
{1, . . . , k} \ T1 such that |T2| = αk, and send flow− two2 = T2 to P1.
7. Upon receipt of flow− two2 from P2, P1 opens all the commitment restricted
to the indices i ∈ T2 and sends flow− two3 = {xi, θi | i ∈ T2} to P2.
8. Upon receipt of flow− two3 from P1, P2 verifies all the commitment restricted
to the indices i ∈ T2: E .Verify(c0i , xi) ?= 1 and E .Verify(c1i , θi) ?= 1. It also sets
T ′2 =
{
i ∈ T2 | θi = θˆi
}
and verifies that rH
(
x|T ′2 , xˆ|T ′2
)
≤ τ
2
. It aborts if the
verifications fail.
9. Both parties set T¯ = {1, . . . , k} \ (T1 ∪ T2). P1 computes ϕ = θ|T¯ ⊕ c(pw), and
P2 computes ϕˆ = θˆ|T¯ ⊕ c(pw). P2 sends flow− three1 = ϕˆ to P1.
10. Upon receipt of flow− three1 from P2, P1 sends flow− three2 = ϕ to P2.
11. Both parties set Iw = {i | ϕi = ϕˆi}. P1 chooses j ∈R J , computes s =
syndj (x|Iw ) and sends flow− four = {j, s} to P2.
12. Upon receipt of flow− four from P1, P2 recovers x˜|Iw from xˆ|Iw with the
help of s, chooses f ∈R F for privacy amplification, computes the session key
sk = f (x˜|Iw ), sends flow− five = f to P1, outputs sk and halts.
13. Upon receipt of flow− five from P2, P1 computes the session key sk = f (x|Iw ),
outputs sk and halts.
Fig. 2. Protocol description.
– flow-zero is identical to QKD’s preparation phase.
– flow-one and flow-two correspond to QKD’s parameter estimation phase.
flow-three corresponds to QKD’s sifting phase. The main differences lie in
these steps. First, the order is inverse in QKD protocol. We note that this
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P1 (client) P2 (server)
CRS : (ck, ck′)
x←$ {0, 1}k
θ←$ {0, 1}k |Ψ〉 = |x〉θ
θˆ←$ {0, 1}k
E .Commitck(xˆ, θˆ) measure |Ψ〉 in basis θˆ
to get xˆ
T1 ⊂R {1, . . . , k}
s.t. |T1| = αk T1
(xˆ, θˆ)|T1
E .Verifyck(·)|T1 E .Commitck′(x, θ)
T2 T2 ⊂R {1, . . . , k} \ T1
s.t. |T2| = αk
(x, θ)|T2
E .Verifyck′(·)|T2
T¯ = {1, . . . , k} \ (T1 ∪ T2) T¯ = {1, . . . , k} \ (T1 ∪ T2)
ϕ = θ|T¯ ⊕ c(pw) ϕˆ = θˆ|T¯ ⊕ c(pw)
ϕˆ
ϕ
Iw = {i | ϕi = ϕˆi} Iw = {i | ϕi = ϕˆi}
j ←$J
s = syndj (x|Iw ) j, s
x˜ = decodej (s, xˆ)
f f ←$F
sk = f(x|Iw ) sk = f(x˜|Iw )
Fig. 3. Schematic Diagram of the Protocol.
ordering of steps makes no differences since the qubits with different bases
are not used in the protocol at all. Second, parameter estimation is done by
using the commitment scheme. Since the commitment is perfectly hiding, it
essentially gives the adversary nothing. Third, instead of directly publishing
the bases as in QKD, both parties exchange one-time pads of their password.
Again, because of the perfect security property, this difference has no effect.
– flow-four and flow-five correspond to QKD’s post-processing phase: error
correcting and privacy amplification, respectively.
Our security definition in this case shares a common “picture” with the one of
QKD. Thus, we follow the main steps of QKD’s proof [Ren05,TL17] with some
modifications. Particularly, we leverage a technical lemma from [DFL+09] to
19
prove statistical bounds on the min-entropy and max-entropy. Unlike QKD’s
proofs, we also need to show that the password is independent of the adversary’s
system. First note that after the commit-and-open phase, we are close to the case
where for any choice of T1 and T2, and for any outcome xT when measuring |Ψ〉
in basis θ|T2 and θˆ|T1 , the relative error rH (x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) (where T ′ = T ′1∪T ′2) gives
an upper bound on the relative error rH (x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) obtained by measuring the
remaining subsystems with i ∈ T¯ , where T¯ = {1, . . . , k} \ (T1 ∪ T2). The latter
value does not depend on pw. Thus, either the protocols aborts because the
error rate exceeded the threshold τ or the server P2 can efficiently recover x|Iw
independently of pw. It follows that the protocol, either aborts or succeeds, only
depends on the adversary’s behavior. The formal proof is given in Appendix D.2.
Corrupted client. When the client is corrupted, recall that in general the
simulator S needs to extract the corrupted party’s input in order to send it to
the trusted party, and needs to simulate its view so that its output corresponds
to the output received back from the trusted party. Specifically, S chooses the
CRS from two different distributions corresponding to the perfectly binding keys
and the perfectly hiding keys. The simulated adversary uses a perfectly binding
key included in the CRS (and since it is quantum-polynomial-time, it cannot
distinguish between the two keys), and S, upon receipt of commitments from the
adversary, uses the trapdoor information to extract the committed values and
re-commit and output them with a perfectly hiding key. Furthermore, S delays
its measurement and only measures its qubits when needed. In particular, S uses
its perfectly hiding trapdoor to equivocate and its perfectly binding trapdoor
to extract the password guess of the adversary. If the guess is correct, then the
simulation is perfect and thus the two states are equal. It thus suffices to argue
that the key sk that the server computes is uniformly random from the view of the
adversary for any fixed pw′ 6= pw. The upper bound of indistinguishability follows
by privacy amplification (Theorem 2.1) and private error correction (Theorem
2.2). The formal proof is given in Appendix D.3.
Corrupted server. The simulation strategy for a corrupted server is the same
as the previous case and we defer the formal proof to Appendix D.4.
Both parties are corrupted. This case is trivial since the simulator S just
runs the adversary A internally and outputs whatever A outputs, hence, the
simulation is perfect.
Theorem 5.2 (main theorem). There exists a protocol in the FCRS-hybrid
model that everlastingly realizes FpwKE in the presence of static-corruption mali-
cious adversaries.
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 4.1. In particular,
the compiled protocol Cεsig (Π) is everlastingly secure against static-corruption
malicious adversaries.
6 Conclusion
We have studied password-authenticated quantum key exchange and proven its
advantage over classical PAKE. The information-theoretic security of traditional
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QKD relies on the very strong assumption regarding the authentication of
communication channels. We show here how to implement this authentication
using only passwords. This only decreases the security from information-theoretic
to everlasting, in which the adversary is supposed to be computationally bounded
during the execution of the protocol but can be unbounded afterwards. This
security is still stronger than the security that can be achieved by classical
PAKE protocols, and also relies on much simpler assumptions and more practical
requirements than fully information-theoretic secure QKD.
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A Preliminaries
A.1 Security Models
We provide a brief overview of security models for multi-party computation (MPC),
in which n players interact in order to compute securely a given function of their
inputs. Formally, consider n players Pi, each owning an input xi, and a classical
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n-input function f . The goal is to compute (y1, . . . , yn) = f (x1, . . . , xn) such
that each player Pi learns yi, and cheating players cannot change the outcome
of the computation (apart by choosing a different input) and do not learn more
about the input (and possibly the output) of honest players than what can be
derived from their own input and their output of the function evaluation.
The Simulation-based Paradigm. The first step towards the solution for this
security definition is the simulation paradigm. Instead of introducing different
notion for each security property, we consider for each protocol, the “ideal behavior”
it should have. Intuitively, we introduce the notion of “ideal world” where there
is a trusted party who collects the inputs from all players, computes the output
and distributes the output to the players. A real protocol is compared to an
ideal protocol, and the real protocol is said to be at least as secure as the ideal
protocol if the real protocol and the ideal protocol have an indistinguishable
input-output behavior. The level of security reached thus also depends on the
specification of the ideal protocol.
Universal Composability. However, as being pointed out in the literature,
the simulation-based paradigm does not play well with composition and in fact,
it only achieves Sequential Composition, i.e., a protocol that is secure under
sequential composition maintains its security when run multiple times, as long as
the executions are run sequentially (meaning that each execution concludes before
the next execution begins). In the case of Concurrent Composition in which
many instances of the same protocol with correlated inputs are run concurrently,
some problems may occur. For example, the messages from one protocol could be
fed into another, or a message from one sub-protocol of a larger application is fed
into another sub-protocol and the overall application becomes insecure. In order
to solve this inherent problem, the so-called UC (for Universal Composability)
framework was introduced. We give a high-level overview of the model below and
refer the reader to [Can01] for more details on the classical version and [Unr10]
for the quantum version.
Ideal World and Real World. We define in the ideal world an entity that one
can never corrupt, called the ideal functionality and usually denoted as F. The
players privately send their inputs to this entity, and receive their corresponding
output the same way. There is no communication between the different players.
F is assumed to behave in a perfectly correct way, without revealing information
other than required, and without being possibly corrupted by an adversary. Once
F is defined, the goal of a protocol pi, executed in a real world in the presence of
an adversary, is then to create a situation equivalent to that obtained with F.
Protocol, Adversary, and Environment. Apart from the protocol participants
which are specified by the protocol, there are two more machines taking part
in the protocol execution. The adversary A (or S in the ideal model) is the
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machine coordinating all corrupted participants analogous to the simulation-
based model. The environment machine Z, playing the role of the distinguisher,
models “everything that is outside the protocol being executed”. It chooses the
inputs, sees the outputs, and may communicate with the adversary at any time.
The adversary has access to the communication between players, but not to the
inputs and outputs of the honest players (it completely controls the dishonest or
corrupted players). On the contrary, the environment has access to the inputs
and outputs of all players, but not to their communication, nor to the inputs and
outputs of the subroutines they can invoke.
A protocol pi securely realizes a functionality F if for every real-world adversary
A there exists an ideal-world adversary S, called the simulator, such that no
environment can distinguish whether it is witnessing the real-world execution with
adversary A or the ideal-world execution with simulator S, with a non-negligible
advantage. Depending on the assumed computing power of the adversary and
the environment we distinguish between computational security, where they are
all considered to be polynomially bounded machines, and statistical security,
where they are assumed to be computationally unbounded. Furthermore, in
[Unr13], Unruh introduces the notion of everlasting security, where the adversary
is considered to be a polynomial-time machine but the environment is assumed
to have unbounded computational power.
In addition, the notion of “hybrid models” is also introduced to model the
concept of set-up assumptions. A protocol pi is said to be realized “in the F-hybrid
model” if pi can invoke the ideal functionality F as a subroutine multiple times.
We note that the environment can never interact directly with F, and thus, F is
usually never invoked at all in the ideal world, and the implementation of F is
simulated solely by the ideal adversary S. The model with no trusted set-up is
called plain.
Ideal Functionalities. We denote FCRS the common reference string functionality,
FOT the oblivious transfer functionality, FCOM the bit commitment functionality,
and FpwKE the password-based key-exchange functionality. The definitions of
these functionalities are given as follows.
The common reference string (CRS) model is modeled by the functionality
FDCRS, which was presented in [BCNP04]. At each call of FDCRS, it sends back the
same reference string, chosen by itself, following a known public distribution D.
We recall it here in Figure 4.
Functionality FDCRS
The functionality FDCRS is parameterized by a distribution D. It interacts with a set
of players and an adversary in the following way:
– Choose a value r←$D.
– Upon receiving a value (CRS, sid) from a player, send (CRS, sid, r) to this player.
Fig. 4. The functionality FDCRS.
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Next, we present the ideal functionality for bit commitment protocols in
Figure 5, which is due to [CF01].
Functionality FCOM
The functionality FCOM proceeds as follows, running with parties P1, . . . , Pn and an
adversary S.
– Upon receiving a value (Commit, sid, Pi, Pj , b) from Pi, where b ∈ {0, 1}, record
the value b and send the message (Receipt, sid, Pi, Pj) to Pj and S. Ignore any
subsequent Commit messages.
– Upon receiving a value (Open, sid, Pi, Pj) from Pi, proceed as follows: If some
value b was previously recoded, then send the message (Open, sid, Pi, Pj , b) to
Pj and S and halt. Otherwise halt.
Fig. 5. The Ideal Commitment functionality for a single commitment.
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a very powerful tool and is sufficient to realize
any secure computation functionality [Kil88]. Informally, OT is a two-party
functionality, involving a sender S with input x0, x1 and a receiver R with an
input σ ∈ {0, 1}. The receiver R learns xσ (and nothing else), and the sender
learns nothing at all. These requirements are captured by the specification of
the OT functionality FOT from [CLOS02], given in Figure 6.
Functionality FOT
The functionality FOT interacts with a sender S, a receiver R and an adversary S.
– Upon receiving a message (sender, sid, x0, x1) from S, where each xi ∈ {0, 1}`,
store (x0, x1). (The lengths of the strings ` is fixed and known to all parties).
– Upon receiving a message (receiver, sid, σ) from R, check if a sender message was
previously sent. If yes, send (sid, xσ) to R and sid to the adversary S and halt.
If not, send nothing to R (but continue running).
Fig. 6. The oblivious transfer functionality FOT.
Our definition of the password-based key-exchange functionality FpwKE (Fig-
ure 7) is identical to the description in [CHK+05]. A natural property of PAKE
is that due to the low entropy of passwords, PAKE protocols are subject to
dictionary attacks. The adversary can break the security of the scheme by trying
all values for the password in the small set of the possible values (i.e., the dictio-
nary). Unfortunately, these attacks can be quite damaging since the attacker has
a non-negligible probability of succeeding. To address this problem, one should
invalidate or block the use of a password whenever a certain number of failed
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attempts occurs. However, this is only effective in the case of online dictionary
attacks in which the adversary must be present and interact with the system in
order to be able to verify whether its guess is correct. Thus, the goal of PAKE
protocol is to restrict the adversary to online dictionary attacks only. In other
words, off-line dictionary attacks, in which the adversary verifies if a password
guess is correct without interacting with the system, should not be possible in a
PAKE protocol.
We refer the reader to [CHK+05] for motivating discussion regarding the
particular choices made in this formulation of the functionality. In particular,
this formulation captures PAKE protocols with implicit authentication (the
version with explicit authentication being described on Figure 8).
The functionality FpwKE
The functionality FpwKE is parameterized by a security parameter λ. It interacts
with an adversary S and a set of parties via the following queries:
Upon receiving a query (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj , pw, role) from party Pi:
Send (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj , role) to S. In addition, if this is the first
NewSession query, or if this is the second NewSession query and there is a
record (Pj , Pi, pw
′), then record (Pi, Pj , pw) and mark this record fresh.
Upon receiving a query (TestPwd, sid, Pi, pw
′) from the adversary S :
If there is a record of the form (Pi, Pj , pw) which is fresh, then do: If pw = pw
′,
mark the record compromised and reply to S with “correct guess”. If pw 6= pw′,
mark the record interrupted and reply with “wrong guess”.
Upon receiving a query (NewKey, sid, Pi, sk) from S, where |sk| = λ :
If there is a record of the form (Pi, Pj , pw), and this is the first NewKey for Pi,
then:
• If this record is compromised, or either Pi or Pj is corrupted, then output
(sid, sk) to player Pi.
• If this record is fresh, and there is a record (Pj , Pi, pw′) with pw = pw′, and
a key sk′ was already sent to Pj , and (Pj , Pi, pw) was fresh at the time, then
output (sid, sk′) to Pi.
• In any other case, pick a new random key sk′ of length λ and send (sid, sk′)
to Pi.
Either way, mark the record (Pi, Pj , pw) as completed.
Fig. 7. The password-based key-exchange functionality FpwKE.
A.2 Cryptographic Primitives
A digital signature scheme [DH76,GMR88] allows a signer to produce a verifiable
proof that he indeed produced a message. We here consider signatures that are
resistant to a quantum chosen message attack, as defined by Boneh and Zhandry
in [BZ13]. We recall the definition and security notion below.
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Definition A.1. A signature scheme is a tuple of efficient classical algorithms
(KeyGen, Sign, Verify), where
– KeyGen(λ), where λ is the security parameter, outputs a pair (sk, vk), where
sk is the (secret) signing key, and vk is the (public) verification key;
– Signsk(M ;µ), outputs a signature σ(M), on a message M , under the signing
key sk and randomness µ;
– Verifyvk(M,σ) checks the validity of the signature σ with respect to the
message M and the verification key vk. And so outputs a bit.
The properties of a digital signature scheme can be defined as follows:
– Correctness: For every pair (vk, sk) generated by KeyGen, for every message
M and for every random µ, we have Verifyvk(M, Signsk(M ;µ)) = 1.
– Existential unforgeability under adaptive quantum chosen-message attack : a
signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) is strongly existentially unforgeable
under a quantum chosen-message attack (EUF-qCMA secure) if, for any
efficient quantum algorithm A and any polynomial q, A’s probability of
success in the following game is negligible in λ:
• Key Generation: The challenger runs (sk, pk)← KeyGen(λ), and gives
vk to A.
• Signing queries: The adversary makes a polynomial q chosen mes-
sage queries. For each query, the challenger chooses randomness r, and
responds by signing each message in the query using r as randomness:∑
m,t
ψm,t |m, t〉 →
∑
m,t
ψm,t |m, t⊕ Signsk(M ; r)〉
• Forgeries: The adversary is required to produce q+ 1 message/signature
pairs. The challenger then checks that all signatures are valid, and that
all message/signature pairs are distinct. If so, the challenger reports that
the adversary wins.
Dual-mode Commitment. We give here an informal security definitions for
commitment schemes, and refer the reader to [Gol01] for a formal definition. A
commitment scheme E is defined by 3 algorithms:
– E .KeyGen (1λ), where λ is the security parameter, generates the global param-
eters param of the scheme (which includes the commitment key), implicitly
given as input to the other algorithms;
– E .Commit (m; r) produces a commitment c on the input message m from a
message spaceM, using the random coins r from a randomizer space R, and
also outputs the opening information w;
– E .Verify (c,m;w) verifies the commitment c of the message m using the
opening information w; it outputs the message m, or ⊥ if the opening check
fails.
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To be useful in practice, a commitment scheme should satisfy two basic
security properties. The first one is hiding, which informally guarantees that no
information about m is leaked through the commitment c. The second one is
binding, which guarantees that the committer cannot generate a commitment c
that can be successfully opened to two different messages. A commitment can be
either perfect hiding (in which case it is perfectly secure from the committer’s point
of view) or perfect binding (in which case it is perfectly secure from the receiver’s
point of view). Interestingly, it is proven that information-theoretically secure
commitment protocols (which are both perfect hiding and perfect binding) cannot
exist classically, nor even if we allow to use quantum mechanics [LC97,May97].
Our construction uses a non-interactive commitment scheme with some special
properties. This scheme, with a quantum-safe construction based on lattice
assumptions, is given in [DFL+09]. First, we want a commitment scheme that has
two different flavors of keys, where the corresponding commitment key is generated
by one of two possible key-generation algorithms: KeyGenH or KeyGenB. For a key
generated by KeyGenH, the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, in which case
the commitment reveals no information about the message. Alternatively, the
commitment key generated by KeyGenB can be perfectly binding, in which case a
valid commitment uniquely defines one possible message. Both key generation
algorithms are probabilistic polynomial time. They output a commitment key
and also some trapdoor information such that we can either open a commitment
to any message (if the commitment key is perfectly hiding, i.e., generated by
KeyGenH), or efficiently extract the committed value (if the commitment key is
perfectly binding, i.e., generated by KeyGenB). Furthermore, we require that keys
generated by KeyGenH and KeyGenB are computationally indistinguishable, even
against quantum adversaries.
The formal definition of dual-mode commitment scheme [GOS12] is given as
follows. For simplicity and efficiency, we consider the common reference string
model, and we assume the commitment key to be contained in the CRS.
Definition A.2. E = (KeyGenH, KeyGenB, Commit, Verify, Open, Ext) is a dual-
mode commitment scheme if it is a standard commitment scheme with the two
additional algorithms:
– Opentk (m1, r1,m2) on the input messages m1 and m2 from a message space
M, and a random coin r1 from a randomizer space R, outputs a random coin
r2 such that Commit (m1; r1) = Commit (m2; r2). Also outputs the opening
information w2 = r2 for the second commitment. This algorithm uses a
trapdoor tk when the key is hiding;
– Extxk (c) on input a commitment m, outputs the message m. This algorithm
uses a trapdoor xk when the key is binding.
and also satisfies the following properties for all non-uniform quantum polynomial
time adversaries A.
Key indistinguishability:
Pr
[
(ck, xk)← KeyGenB(1k) : A (ck) = 1
] c≈ Pr [(ck, tk)← KeyGenH(1k) : A (ck) = 1]
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Perfect binding:
Pr
[
(ck, xk)← KeyGenB(1k) : ∃(m1, r1), (m2, r2) ∈M×R
such that m1 6= m2 and Commit (m1; r1) = Commit (m2; r2)
]
= 0
Perfect extractability:
Pr
[
(ck, xk)← KeyGenB(1k) : ∀(m, r) ∈M×R : Extxk (Commit (m; r)) = m
]
= 1
Perfect hiding:
Pr
[
(ck1, tk1)← KeyGenH(1k) : A (ck1, Commit (m1; ∗)) = 1
]
= Pr
[
(ck2, tk2)← KeyGenH(1k) : A (ck2, Commit (m2; ∗)) = 1
]
Perfect trapdoor opening:
Pr
[
(ck, tk)← KeyGenH(1k); (m1,m2)← A (ck) ; r1 ← R; r2← Opentk (m1, r1,m2) :
Commit (m1; r1) = Commit (m2; r2) if m1,m2 ∈M
]
= 1
Perfect trapdoor opening indistinguishability:
Pr
[
(ck, tk)← KeyGenH(1k); (m1,m2)← A (ck) ; r1 ← R; r2 ← Opentk (m1, r1,m2) :
(m1,m2) ∈M and A(r1) = 1
]
= Pr
[
(ck, tk)← KeyGenH(1k); (m1,m2)← A(ck); r2 ← R :
(m1,m2) ∈M and A(r2) = 1
]
B Proofs of the Impossibility Results for PAKE:
Reduction from EQUALITY to PAKE
B.1 Reduction from EQUALITY to PAKE
We now prove the impossibility results stated in Section 3, by reducing the
problem of constructing a scheme for the PAKE functionality to the problem of
constructing a scheme for an equality-testing functionality FEQ.
We consider an explicit mutual authentication PAKE functionality Fe-pwKE
whose description is given in Figure 8. The description of the functionality is a
modified version of the description in [CDVW12,ACCP09].
Fe-pwKE implies FEQ. We define an equality-testing functionality FEQ (Figure 9)
that, roughly speaking, takes inputs from two parties and does the following:
– if the inputs are equal, outputs the value 1 to both parties; moreover, if either
party is corrupted, the adversary is allowed to set the output.
– if the inputs are unequal, send both parties the special symbol ⊥.
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The functionality Fe-pwKE
The functionality Fe-pwKE is parameterized by a security parameter λ and a “dic-
tionary” D. It interacts with an adversary A and a set of parties via the following
queries:
Upon receiving a query (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj , pi) from party Pi:
Send (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj) to A. In addition, if this is the first NewSession
query, or if this is the second NewSession query and there is a record
(sid, Pj , Pi, pi
′), then record (sid, Pi, Pj , pi) and mark this record fresh. In
the latter case, also record (sid, ready), and send it to A.
Upon receiving a query (TestPwd, sid, P, pi′) from A:
If P ∈ {Pi, Pj}, and there is a record of the form (sid, P, ∗, pi) which is fresh,
then do: If pi = pi′, mark the record compromised and reply to A with “correct
guess”. If pi 6= pi′, mark the record interrupted and reply to A with “wrong
guess”.
Upon receiving a query (NewKey, sid, Pi, Pj , sk) from A, where |sk| = λ :
If there is a record (sid, ready), and there is a record of the form (sid, P, ∗, pi)
where P ∈ {Pi, Pj} then:
• If this record is fresh, and there is a record (sid, ∗, P, pi′) marked fresh with
pi = pi′, pick a new random key sk′ of length λ and set out = sk′.
• If this record is compromised, or either Pi or Pj is corrupted, then set
out = sk.
• In any other case, set out =⊥.
Either way, mark both record (sid, P, ∗, pi) and (sid, ∗, P, pi′) as completed.
Upon receiving a query (Deliver, sid, P ) from A:
If P ∈ {Pi, Pj}, and there is a record of the form (sid, P, ∗, pi) which is completed,
then send (deliver, sid, out) to P . Ignore all subsequent (Deliver, P ) queries for
the same player P .
Fig. 8. The password-based key-exchange functionality Fe-pwKE with explicit mutual
authentication.
More precisely, FEQ captures a protocol between two parties Pi, Pj started
by having the two parties sending messages to the functionality with their secret
strings pii, pij . If the inputs match, the functionality assigns the output to be 1,
otherwise it sets the output to be ⊥. Finally, the adversary A instructs the
functionality when to send the output to both parties. Thus, this definition
corresponds to achieving explicit mutual authentication. We also allow the
adversary three special powers. First, we allow him to set the output if one of
the parties is corrupted and both the parties have the same input. Furthermore,
he controls the delivery of messages to the parties. This is an ability that he
inevitably has in the real world. Finally, as in the case of PAKE, the low entropy
of the messages in the dictionary D makes online dictionary attacks unavoidable,
which is captured by the Test query given to the adversary.
The following lemma shows that the Fe-pwKE functionality already implements
the FEQ. Though this seems to be a folklore, we also give a proof of this lemma
for completeness.
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The functionality FEQ
The functionality FEQ is parameterized by a security parameter λ and a “dictionary”
D. It interacts with two parties Pi, Pj , and an adversary A via the following queries:
Upon receiving a query (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj , pi) from party Pi:
Send (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj) to A. In addition, do the following:
• If this is the first NewSession query, then record (sid, Pi, Pj , pi) and mark
this record fresh.
• If this is the second NewSession query and there is a record (sid, Pj , Pi, pi′)
which is fresh, then do: if pi = pi′, then set out = 1, otherwise, set out =⊥.
Mark both records completed.
Upon receiving a query (Test, sid, P, pi′), P ∈ {Pi, Pj} from A :
If there is a record of the form (sid, P, ∗, pi) which is fresh, then do: If pi = pi′,
mark the record compromised and reply to A with “correct guess”. If pi 6= pi′,
mark the record interrupted and reply to A with “wrong guess”.
Upon receiving a query (Output, sid, γ), γ ∈ {1,⊥} from A :
If there is a record of the form (sid, ∗, ∗, pi) which is compromised, or one of
the parties is corrupted, then set out = γ. If this record is interrupted, then set
out =⊥. Otherwise, do nothing.
Upon receiving a query (Deliver, sid, P ), P ∈ {Pi, Pj} from A :
If there is a record of the form (sid, P, ∗, pi) which is completed, send
(deliver, sid, out) to the player P . Ignore all subsequent (Deliver, P ) queries for
the same player P .
Fig. 9. The equality-testing functionality FEQ.
Lemma B.1. There is a protocol that perfectly implements the FEQ functionality
in the Fe-pwKE hybrid model, tolerating adaptive corruptions and without assuming
authenticated channels.
Proof. The protocol that implements FEQ simply forwards the parties’ messages
to the Fe-pwKE functionality. In particular, on input (sid, pii) from the environment,
the party Pi sends a message (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj , pi) to Fe-pwKE. When Pi
receives a message (deliver, sid, out) back from Fe-pwKE, if out 6=⊥, Pi outputs 1,
otherwise, it outputs ⊥ and terminates. Similarly, Pj does the same.
We simply show how to simulate the adversary A′s messages.
Simulating a (Test, sid, P, pi) query from A: IfA already sent a (Deliver, P )
query before, ignore this query. Otherwise, send a query (TestPwd, sid, P, pi)
to Fe-pwKE, and record the response from Fe-pwKE (either “correct guess” or
“wrong guess”).
Simulating a (Output, sid, γ) query from A: IfA already sent a (Deliver, P )
query before, ignore this query. Otherwise, send a query (NewKey, sid, Pi, Pj , γ)
to Fe-pwKE.
Simulating a (Deliver, sid, P ) query from A: IfA already sent a (Deliver, P )
query before, ignore this query. Otherwise, send a query (Deliver, sid, P ) to
Fe-pwKE.
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It is easy to see that the simulation is perfect, and the view of the environment
is identical in the real execution of A in the protocol (in the Fe-pwKE-hybrid model)
and the simulated ideal-model execution with FEQ.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
To prove Theorem 3.1, we employ a general result which proves that for the
class of deterministic, two-sided functionalities including the equality-testing
function, the security for one party implies complete insecurity for the other in
the simulation-based model.
Lemma B.2 ([BCS12, Theorem 2]). If a protocol pi for the evaluation of a
deterministic two-sided function F is ε-correct and ε-secure against Bob, then
there is a cheating strategy for Alice (where she uses input u0 and Bob has input
v) which gives her v˜ distributed according to some distribution Q(v˜|u0, v) such
that for all u: Pr [v˜ ← Q : F (u, v) = F (u, v˜)] ≥ 1− 28ε.
Proof (Theorem 3.1). First we note that the reduction from FEQ to Fe-pwKE in
Lemma B.1 holds unconditionally in the UC model, which implies perfect security
in the simulation-based model. We then prove by contradiction, if there is a
statistically secure PAKE protocol in the plain model, then by Lemma B.1, that
protocol is also a statistically secure protocol for FEQ in the plain model, which
violates Lemma B.2.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
First note that according to the following lemma, the impossibility of everlasting
quantum-UC security implies the impossibility of statistical quantum-UC security.
Lemma B.3 ([Unr13, Lemma 1]). Let pi and ρ be protocols. If pi statistically
quantum-UC-emulates ρ, then pi everlastingly quantum-UC-emulates ρ.
In the following, we thus focus on the proof for the everlasting security.
Assuming some trusted setup, the following lemma states the impossibility of
everlastingly realizing FEQ using only quantum-passively-realizable functionalities,
including FCRS (described in Figure 4).
Lemma B.4. There is no statistically or everlastingly quantum-UC secure pro-
tocol that realizes FEQ which only uses quantum-passively-realizable functionalities
as trusted setup assumptions.
Before proving Lemma B.4, we recall the impossibility of achieving everlast-
ingly quantum-UC-secure oblivious transfer.
Lemma B.5 ([Unr13, Theorem 5]). There is no statistically or everlastingly
quantum-UC secure OT protocol which only uses quantum-passively-realizable
functionalities as trusted setup assumptions.
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We use the notion of reductions between MPC functionalities, that allows
us to form “classes” of functionalities with similar cryptographic complexity:
Following [MPR10], a functionality is said trivial or feasible if it can be realized
in the UC framework in the plain model (with no setup assumptions), and it is
said complete if it is sufficient for computing arbitrary other functions, under
appropriate complexity assumptions, when used as trusted setups. We recall the
following results that are proven in [Unr10,FKS+13].
Lemma B.6 ([Unr10, Theorem 15] and [FKS+13, Theorem 2]). The
following statements hold:
1. If a protocol pi statistically UC realizes a functionality F, then pi statistically
quantum-UC realizes the functionality F (Quantum lifting theorem).
2. Feasibility in the quantum world is equivalent to classical feasibility, in both
the computational and statistical setting.
To show a reduction from FEQ to FOT, we employ the following intermediate
results.
Definition B.1 (OT-cores). Let F be a deterministic two-party function, ΓA,
ΓB be the input alphabet of two parties, ΩA, ΩB be the output distribution of
two parties, and fA, fB is the output values of the two parties. A quadruple
(x, x′, y, y′) ∈ Γ 2A × Γ 2B is an OT-core of F , if the following three conditions are
met:
1. We have that fA(x, y) = fA(x, y
′).
2. We have that fB(x, y) = fB(x
′, y).
3. We have that fA(x
′, y) 6= fA(x′, y′) or fB(x, y′) 6= fB(x′, y′) (or both).
In [KMQ11] the so-called Classification theorem was proven, which shows
a necessary and sufficient condition to have a reduction protocol from an ideal
functionality F to FOT.
Theorem B.1 (The Classification Theorem [KMQ11]). There exists an
OT protocol that is statistically secure against passive adversaries in the F-hybrid
model, for some F, if and only if F has an OT-core.
Proof of Lemma B.4. We first show that the equality-testing function FEQ admits
an OT-core. ConsiderFEQ := (ΓA, ΓB , ΩA, ΩB , fA, fB), without loss of generality,
assume ΓA = ΓB = Γ . Let c ∈ Γ be a random value drawn from the input
distribution, then a quadruple (c, c+ 1, c− 1, c+ 1) is an OT-core of FEQ because:
fA(c, c− 1) = fA(c, c+ 1) = 0
fB(c, c− 1) = fB(c+ 1, c− 1) = 0
0 = fA(c+ 1, c− 1) 6= fA(c+ 1, c+ 1) = 1
Then the classification theorem (Theorem B.1) tells us that there exists an OT
protocol that is statistically secure against passive adversaries in the FEQ-hybrid
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model. Using the lifting theorem (Lemma B.6), that protocol is also statistically
secure against quantum-passive adversaries in the FEQ-hybrid model.
We now prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume that there exists an
everlasting quantum-UC-secure protocol pi realizing FEQ which only uses quantum-
passively-realizable functionalities. Let ρ be the protocol resulting from pi by
replacing invocations of FEQ by invocations of the subprotocol pi. Then ρ is a
everlasting quantum-UC-secure protocol realizing FOT which only uses quantum-
passively-realizable functionalities against quantum-passive adversaries. This
contradicts Lemma B.5.
Because of Lemma B.3, the impossibility of statistical security follows imme-
diately from the impossibility of everlasting security.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Similarly to Theorem 3.1, the result follows from Lemma B.1
and Lemma B.4.
C Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. We consider a protocol Φ = Cεsig(Π) which is the protocol resulting
by applying the split authentication transformation to a two-party quantum
protocol Π between two honest parties P1, P2 and an adversary A. The simulator
of protocol Π is denoted by SΠ .
Simulating when neither of the parties is corrupted: We show that the security
of Φ in this case reduces to either the security of Π when one of the parties is
corrupted or the security of Π when neither of the parties is corrupted in the
presence of a quantum passive unbounded adversary. Formally, we say that vkj
is Pj ’s authentic key if it is the key generated by Pj in the internal simulation by
S. Simulator S internally invokes a copy of two uncorrupted parties and runs an
interaction between A and these simulated copies as follows:
1. Whenever A delivers a message vk to an uncorrupted party Pi, S simulates
the actions of Pi in the link initialization phase.
2. Whenever an internally simulated uncorrupted party Pi completes the link
initialization phase with output sid, simulator S determines the set Hi to
be the set of the uncorrupted party Pj such that the authentic verification
key sent by Pj is included in sid. (Recall that because S internally runs all
uncorrupted parties, it can determine whether or not the key vkj that is
chosen for Pj is included in sid). S then checks for the previously computed
set Hj , it holds that either:
– Hi = Hj 6= ∅ and sidHi = sidHj , or
– Hi = Hj = ∅ and sidHi 6= sidHj .
If this holds, then S runs the simulator SΠ . Otherwise, S halts and outputs
fail.
3. S outputs whatever A outputs.
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It is easy to verify that as long as S does not output fail, the security of Φ
reduces to the security of Π: the first condition corresponds to the security of Π
with quantum passive adversaries, and the second condition corresponds to the
security of Π in the case one of the parties is corrupted. It therefore suffices to
show that S outputs a fail with at most negligible probability εsig.
There are three events that could cause a fail message:
1. Hi = Hj, and yet sidHi 6= sidHj : By the behavior of S, we have that if Hi
and Hj are defined, and Hi = Hj 6= ∅, then Pi received Pj ’s authentic key
and vice versa. On the other hand, Pj only concludes this phase with output
if sidi = sidj and if the verification of sidi with the verification key of Pi
passes. If the event we are considering here occurred with a non-negligible
probability, then sidi 6= sidj , and so in the internal simulation by S, we have
that Pi has never signed on the sid which Pj received in the name of Pi. Thus,
A must have forged a signature, and it can be used to break the signature
scheme.
2. Hi 6= ∅, and Hj = ∅: Let Hi = {Pj} with Pj be an uncorrupted party.
Then, using the same arguments as above, except with negligible probability,
Pi must have the same sid as Pj . By the construction of S, it therefore holds
that Hi = Hj .
3. Hi = Hj = ∅, and yet sidi = sidj: By the construction of S, if sidi = sidj
then Hi = Hj . This event therefore never occurs.
We conclude that Φ is everlastingly ε + εsig-secure according to Definition
4.2 in this case.
Simulating when one of the parties is corrupted: Since the protocol is completely
symmetric between the two parties, the simulation for a corrupted party is
identical to that for the other corrupted party.
Simulator S internally invokes a copy of the uncorrupted party and runs an
interaction between A and the simulated copy as follows:
1. In the Link Initialization phase, S behaves honestly and aborts if A aborts.
2. After the Link Initialization phase, S runs the simulator SΠ .
3. S outputs whatever A outputs.
It is straightforward to verify that a real execution of protocol Φ is identical
to its ideal-model execution, and that the security of Φ reduces to the security
of Π. This is due to the fact that S just mimics the actions of the uncorrupted
party and the local outputs of the uncorrupted party in the internal simulation
correspond exactly to the outputs of the actual uncorrupted party in the ideal
model. Thus Φ is everlastingly ε-secure in this case.
D Proof of Theorem 5.1
D.1 Technical Tools
Before proceeding through the actual proof, we recall some technical tools.
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Conditional Independence. We need to express that a random variable X is
independent of a quantum state E when given a random variable Y . Independence
means that when given Y , the state E gives no additional information on X.
Another way to understand this is that E can be obtained from X and Y by
solely processing Y . Formally, adopting the notion introduced in [DFSS07], this
is expressed by requiring that ρXYE equals ρX↔Y↔E , where the latter is defined
as
ρX↔Y↔E :=
∑
x,y
PXY (xy) |x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE .
In other words, ρXYE = ρX↔Y↔E precisely if ρ
xy
E = ρ
y
E for all x and y. To
further illustrate its meaning, notice that if the Y -register is measured and value y
is obtained, then the state ρX↔Y↔E collapses to
(∑
x PX|Y (x|y) |x〉〈x|
)⊗ ρyE , so
that indeed no further information on x can be obtained from the E-register. This
notation naturally extends to ρX↔Y↔E|E :=
∑
x,y PXY |E (xy) |x〉〈x|⊗|y〉〈y|⊗ρyE|E .
Technical Lemmas. The following chain rule shows that the conditional min-
entropy Hε∞ (A|B)ρ can decrease by at most log (|Z|) when conditioning on an
additional classical system Z.
Lemma D.1 ([WTHR11, Lemma 11]). Let ε ≥ 0, and let ρABZ be a tripar-
tite state that is classical on Z with respect to some orthonormal basis {|z〉}z∈Z .
Then
Hε∞ (A|BZ)ρ ≥ Hε∞ (A|B)ρ − log (|Z|) .
We consider a tri-partite quantum state ρABC , and two generalized measure-
ments acting on A: X with elements {MxA} and Z with elements {NzA}. The joint
state of the classical outcome X when measuring A with respect to X and the
system B is given as a bipartite cq-state ρXB :=
∑
x |x〉〈x| ⊗ τxB , where τxB =
trAC
{
MxA
†MxAρABC
}
. Similarly, we define ρZC , where the measurement Z in-
stead of X is applied to A and where we keep system C instead of B. Assume
dim (HA) = n, we define
ci := max
x,z
∥∥∥M+,xAi (M×,zAi )†∥∥∥2∞ , and c¯ := maxi∈[n] (∏ ci)
1
n
.
We state the uncertainty relation in a form of smooth min- and max-entropy,
applying to the setup with the computational and Hadamard basis.
Theorem D.1 ([TR11, Theorem 1]). Let ρABC ∈ P (HA ⊗HB ⊗HC), let
ε > 0 and let X and Z be two generalized measurements on A. Then,
Hε∞ (X|B)ρ + Hε0 (Z|C)ρ ≥ log
(
1
c¯
)
n,
where c¯ ∈ (0, 1).
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We now complete the proof of Theorem 5.1 in the following sections. In
our proof, we use upper case letters for the random variables in the proofs that
describe the respective values in the protocol. In particular, we write W,XW , XˆW
for the random variables taking values pw, x|Iw , xˆ|Iw , respectively.
In our proof, we assume that the (quantum) system containing all the informa-
tion a potential adversary might have gained during the protocol execution can
be decomposed into a classical part Z and a purely quantum part E. Because the
commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, it essentially leaks no information, thus
we omit the transcript of the commitments in the description of Z (in other words,
Z implicitly includes the transcript of the commitments). We write Z = (Z ′, S, J)
and understand that Z ′ denote the classical system of the adversary without the
random variables S and J .
D.2 Simulating the case when neither of the parties is Corrupted
In order to show that the protocol is secure, it suffices to show that
δ
(
ρKP1KP2WZE , ρW↔Z↔E
)
=
1
2
∥∥ρKP1KP2WZE − ρKP1KP2 ⊗ ρW↔Z↔E∥∥1
is negligible, where ρKP1KP2WZE is the common output state of the protocol and
ρKP1KP2 is defined as a perfect key as follows:
ρKP1KP2 :=
1
2λ
∑
sk∈{0,1}λ
|sk〉〈sk| ⊗ |sk〉〈sk|.
The proof will be completed using the following claims, which are proven
below:
1. Claim D.1. The correctness of the protocol:
Pr [KP1 6= KP2 |KP1 6=⊥,KP2 6=⊥] ≤ εcor.
2. Claim D.2. The secrecy of the session key:
d
(
ρKP1KP2WZE
) ≤ εsec.
3. Claim D.3. W is independent of the adversary’s quantum system:
ρW↔Z↔E = ρWZE .
We now complete the proof as follows. Similarly to QKD’s proof, we will
employ the following lemma which allows us to split the norm into two terms
corresponding to correctness and secrecy.
Lemma D.2 ([TL17, Lemma 1]). Let εcor, εsec ∈ [0, 1) be two constants. If,
for every common input state ρABE ∈ P (HA ⊗HB ⊗HE) and ρKP1KP2WZE =
Π (ρABE), we have
Pr [KP1 6= KP2 |KP1 6=⊥,KP2 6=⊥] ≤ εcor
39
and
d
(
ρKP1WZE
) ≤ εsec.
Then, d
(
ρKP1KP2WZE
) ≤ εcor + εsec.
The following sequence of hybrids establishes what we want, where the last
inequality follows from the above lemma.
δ
(
ρKP1KP2WZE , ρW↔Z↔E
)
=
1
2
∥∥ρKP1KP2WZE − ρKP1KP2 ⊗ ρW↔Z↔E∥∥1
=
1
2
∥∥ρKP1KP2WZE − ρKP1KP2 ⊗ ρWZE∥∥1
= d
(
ρKP1KP2WZE
)
≤ εcor + εsec.
It remains to prove the three claims, which essentially give bounds on the
security parameters in terms of the protocol parameters, made in the proof above.
The first claim establishes correctness of the protocol. Correctness of the
protocol is ensured in the error correction step using private error correction and
consequently correctness can be bounded in terms of the probability of failure
decoding of the small-bias family of codes.
Claim D.1. Let εcor be the probability of failure decoding of binary linear code C.
For every common input state ρAB ∈ P (HA ⊗HB) and ρKP1KP2WZ = Π (ρAB)
we have
Pr [KP1 6= KP2 |KP1 6=⊥,KP2 6=⊥] ≤ εcor.
Proof. We consider the following chain of inequalities:
Pr [KP1 6= KP2 |KP1 6=⊥,KP2 6=⊥] = Pr
[
F (XW ) 6= F (X˜W ) ∧ decode (S) = X˜W
]
≤ Pr
[
XW 6= X˜W ∧ decode (S) = X˜W
]
= Pr
[
XW 6= X˜W
]
· Pr
[
decode (S) = X˜W |X˜W 6= XW
]
≤ Pr
[
decode (S) = X˜W |X˜W 6= XW
]
≤ εcor.
Note that S = synd (XW ). The first inequality is a consequence of the
fact XW = X˜W implies F (XW ) = F (X˜W ). The second inequality follows
since Pr
[
XW 6= X˜W
]
≤ 1 and the last one by definition of the error-correcting
code.
The second claim asserts secrecy.
Claim D.2. For every common input state ρABE ∈ P (HA ⊗HB ⊗HE) and
ρKP1KP2WZE = Π (ρABE) we have
d
(
ρKP1WZE
) ≤ εec + εpa = 2− 12 (g(ε)+ βn2 ) + (2ε+ 2− 12 (g(ε)−λ)) ,
for some ε > 0 and c¯ ∈ (0, 1), where g(ε) is given as g(ε) = (log ( 1c¯ )− h (τ + ε)− 12)n.
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Instead of following the proof of statistical bounds on the min-entropy and
max-entropy of QKD’s proof, we leverage the proof technique from [DFL+09].
In the following, let T = T1 ∪ T2 and T ′ =
{
i ∈ T | θi = θˆi
}
, is a random
subset of arbitrary size of T . Let the random variable Test describe the choice
of test = (T, T ′) as specified above, and consider the state
ρTestAE = ρTest ⊗ |ϕAE〉〈ϕAE | =
∑
test
PTest (test) |test〉〈test| ⊗ |ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |
consisting of the classical Test and the quantum state ϕAE .
Lemma D.3 ([DFL+09, Corollary 4.4]). For any ε > 0, xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m, and
θˆ ∈ {+,×}m, define
ρ˜TestAE =
∑
test
PTest (test) |test〉〈test| ⊗ |ϕ˜testAE 〉〈ϕ˜testAE |,
where for any test = (T, T ′):
|ϕ˜testAE 〉 =
∑
x∈Btest
αtestx |x〉θˆ |ψ〉xE
for Btest = {x ∈ {0, 1}m | rH (x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) ≤ rH (x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) + ε} and arbitrary coef-
ficients αtestx ∈ C.
For any fixed test = (T, T ′), and for any fixed x|T ∈ {0, 1}αm with δ = rH (x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) ≤
1
2 , let |ψAE〉 be the state to which |ϕ˜testAE 〉 collapses when for every i ∈ T subsystem
Ai is measured in basis θˆi and xi is observed, where we understand A in |ψAE〉
to be restricted to the registers Ai with i ∈ T¯ . Finally, let σE = trA(|ψAE〉〈ψAE |)
and let the random variable X describe the outcome when measuring the remain-
ing n = (1− α)m subsystems of A in basis θ|T¯ ∈ {+,×}n. Then, for any subset
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and any x|I ,
H∞ (X|I |X|I¯ = x|I¯) ≥ dH
(
θ|I , θˆ|I
)
− h(δ + ε)n and H0 (σE) ≤ h(δ + ε)n.
With this in hand, we wish to bound the smooth max-entropy of the state
when passing the parameter estimation test (flow-one and flow-two in our
protocol).
Proposition D.1. For any ε > 0 such that ε2 < Pr [KP1 = KP2 6=⊥], the fol-
lowing holds:
Hε0 (XWW |Z ′E) ≤ h(τ + ε)n.
Proof. We define the event E = rH
(
XW , XˆW
)
≥ τ . Hoeffding’s inequality
[Hoe63] gives an upper bound on the probability of the unlikely coincidence
where the parameter estimation test passes with threshold τ but the fraction of
errors between XW and XˆW exceeds the threshold τ by a constant amount, that
is,
Pr [KP1 = KP2 6=⊥ ∧E ] ≤ ε2.
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By mean of smoothing, we remove the above unlikely event from our state
ρXWWZ′E :
Hε0 (XWW |Z ′E) ≤ H0 (XWW |Z ′E) ≤ h(τ + ε)n.
By applying the uncertainty relation from Theorem D.1, we get the lower
bound on the smooth min-entropy of P1’s measurement outcomes.
Proposition D.2. For any ε > 0 such that ε2 < Pr [KP1 = KP2 6=⊥], the fol-
lowing holds:
Hε∞ (XWW |ZE) ≥ nq −
n
2
,
where we introduced the shorthand q = log
(
1
c¯
)− h (τ + ε), for some c¯ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Combining Proposition D.1 and the Uncertainty Relation Theorem D.1
yields
Hε∞ (XWW |Z ′E) ≥ nq.
Finally, we show the lower bound of the smooth min-entropy after flow-five:
nq ≤ Hε∞ (XWW |Z ′E) ≤ Hε∞ (XWW |Z ′SJE) +
n
2
,
which follows by the chain rule D.1, and the fact that |S| = n2 and J is uniformly
distributed. We conclude the proof by summarizing Z = (Z ′, S, J).
With all these necessary technical ingredients, we establish the secrecy of the
key and finish the proof of the second claim.
Proof of Claim D.2. By the triangle inequality, we have that
d
(
ρKP1WZE
) ≤ d (ρKP1WZ′E)+ d (ρKP1WSJE) .
The Privacy Amplification Theorem 2.1 and Private Error Correction Theorem
2.2 applied with the bound given in Proposition D.2 then immediately yields the
desired inequality.
We complete the proof of the case when neither of the parties is corrupted by
proving the following claim (this is the difference of a PAKE protocol from the
standard key exchange’s proof).
Claim D.3. W is independent of the adversary’s quantum system:
ρW↔Z↔E = ρWZE .
Proof. Because W is independent of Z, it is sufficient to show that whether the
protocol was aborted or completed gives no additional information on W : By
using Lemma D.3, we are close to the case where for any choice of T and T ′, and
for any outcome xT when measuring |Ψ〉 in basis θ|T2 and θˆ|T1 , the relative error
rH (x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) gives an upper bound (except with a negligible probability) on
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the relative error rH (x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) obtained by measuring the remaining subsystems
with i ∈ T¯ . In particular, we have
rH (x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) ≤
1
2
rH (x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) .
Furthermore, since the set Iw =
{
i ∈ T¯ | θi = θˆi
}
is a subset of T¯ of essen-
tially half the size, rH (x|Iw , xˆ|Iw) ≤ 2 · rH (x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) holds with overwhelming
probability. Also note that rH (x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) does not depend on pw. We can now
do the case distinction:
Case 1: If rH (x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) ≤ τ2 then x|Iw and xˆ|Iw differ in at most a τ -fraction
of their positions, and thus the server P2 correctly recovers x˜|Iw = x|Iw , no
matter what pw is.
Case 2: If rH (x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) ≥ τ2 then rH (x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) ≥ τ . Hence, the protocol
always aborts during either flow-one or flow-two.
We have shown that for both cases the value of W only depends on the adversary’s
behavior, which proves the claim.
D.3 Simulating the case when the Client is Corrupted
Description of the Simulator. Recall that in general the simulator S needs to
extract the corrupted partys input in order to send it to the trusted party, and
needs to simulate its view so that its output corresponds to the output received
back from the trusted party. The simulator S works as follows.
1. When initialized with security parameter λ, S first runs the key-generation
algorithms of the dual-mode commitment scheme E three times, and obtains
the key pairs (ckH, tk) ← E .KeyGenH(1λ), (ck′B, xk) ← E .KeyGenB(1λ) and
(ck′H, tk
′)← E .KeyGenH(1λ).
2. The simulator also chooses a “dummy password” pw′ at random for the
simulated copy of the honest party P2.
3. S initializes the real-world adversary A, giving it the pair (ck, ck′) = (ckH, ck′B)
as the common reference string. Thereafter, S interacts with the ideal
functionality FpwKE and its subroutine A. (Essentially, S uses ck = ckH for
its commitments and A uses ck′ = ck′B for its commitments. See details in
Step 5 right below.)
4. This interaction is implemented by the simulator S just following the protocol
Π on behalf of the honest party, except for the following modifications:
(a) S measures the received qubits only when needed. In the commitment
phase, it simply commits to xˆ = 0k, and commits to θˆ honestly. It
measures the qubits within set T1 upon receiving flow− one2, then, in
the open phase, to open as an arbitrary (xˆ|T1 , θˆ|T1), the simulator just
uses the trapdoor information tk to equivocate.
(b) For each commitment (c0i , c
1
i ) received from the simulated adversary A,
S uses the trapdoor information xk to extract A’s committed values x
and θ. It then uses the commitment key ck′H to re-commit these values.
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(c) S measures all the remaining qubits in A’s basis θ. However, it still
verifies only whether xi = xˆi for those i ∈ T ′2 =
{
i ∈ T2 | θi = θˆi
}
.
(d) It sends a random value ϕˆ ∈ {0, 1}n to A.
(e) Upon receiving ϕ from A, it attempts to decode pw∗ from c(pw) = θ|T¯⊕ϕ.
If this succeeds, it sets pw′ equal to pw∗ and uses pw′ in a TestPwd query
to FpwKE. If this is a “correct guess”, S replaces the dummy password
pw′ with the correct password pw∗, and proceeds with the simulation.
5. S outputs whatever A outputs, except it replaces A’s commitments with its
own ones in Step 4b.
Proof of Indistinguishability. We need to show that the state output by S above
is statistically close to the state output by A when executing Π with a real P2.
First, note that because A is quantum-polynomial-time, it cannot distinguish
the commitment key provided by the simulator and the commitment key in the
real world, except with a negligible probability. If pw′ is a correct guess, then
the simulation is perfect and thus the two states are equal. It thus suffices to
argue that the key sk that the Server P2 computes is uniformly random from the
view of A for any fixed pw 6= pw′.
Now, by re-using Lemma D.3 from [DFL+09, Corollary 4.4], we get the
common state after the flow-two is statistically close to a state for which it is
guaranteed that H∞ (X|I) ≥ dH
(
θ|I , θˆ|I
)
− h(τ + ε)n for any I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
and H0 (ρZE) ≤ h(τ + ε)n. We make a case distinction:
Case 1: Decoding of θ|T¯ ⊕ ϕ succeeded, i.e. c(pw∗) = θ|T¯ ⊕ ϕ. Since the code c
has a minimum distance d = γn, it follows that θ|T¯ ⊕ ϕ is at least γn from
c(pw), for any pw∗ 6= pw.
Case 2: Decoding of θ|T¯ ⊕ ϕ failed, it also follows that θ|T¯ ⊕ ϕ is at least γn
from c(pw), since then θ|T¯ ⊕ ϕ is at least γn from any codeword.
In both cases, we always have dH (θ|T¯ , c(pw)⊕ ϕ) = dH (θ|T¯ ⊕ ϕ, c(pw)) ≥ γn.
Furthermore, denote c′(pw) = c(pw) ⊕ ϕ, by the random sampling theory, the
Hamming distance between θ|Iw and θˆ|Iw = c′(pw)|Iw is at least
(
γ
2 − ε
)
n, with
overwhelming probability for arbitrary ε > 0. We conclude that H∞ (XW ) ≥(
γ
2 − ε− h(τ + ε)
)
n and H0 (ρZE) ≤ h(τ+ε)n. Hence, the chain rules for smooth
min-entropy implies that
Hε∞ (XW |ZE) ≥ H∞ (XW )−H0 (ρZE) ≥
(γ
2
− ε− 2h(τ + ε)
)
n.
We can complete the proof as follows.
d
(
ρKP2WW ′Z′E|W ′ 6=W
)
= d
(
ρW↔W ′↔Z′E|W ′ 6=W
)
≤ εpa = 2ε+ 2− 12 ((
γ
2−ε−2h(τ+ε))n−λ),
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and
d
(
ρKP2WW ′SJE|W ′ 6=W
)
= d
(
ρW↔W ′↔SJE|W ′ 6=W
)
≤ εec = δ × 2− 12 (
γ
2−ε−2h(τ+ε)− 12 )n
≤ 2−βn4 × 2− 12 ( γ2−ε−2h(τ+ε)− 12 )n
= 2−
1
2 (
β
2 +
γ
2−ε−2h(τ+ε)− 12 )n,
where both exact equalities come from the independency of W , which, when
conditioned on W ′ 6= W , translates to independency given W ′, and the inequali-
ties follow by privacy amplification (Theorem 2.1) and private error correction
(Theorem 2.2), respectively. By the choice of parameters, we have that both two
bounds are negligible in n.
Overall, by the triangle inequality, the claim follows with µ = εec + εpa, that
is,
δ
(
ρKP2WW ′ZE|W ′ 6=W , ρW↔W ′↔ZE|W ′ 6=W
)
= d
(
ρKP2WW ′ZE|W ′ 6=W
)
≤ d
(
ρKP2WW ′Z′E|W ′ 6=W
)
+
d
(
ρKP2WW ′SJE|W ′ 6=W
)
≤ εpa + εec.
D.4 Simulating the case when the Server is Corrupted
Description of the Simulator. The simulator for the corrupted Server follows the
same strategy as the case of the corrupted Client. Formally, the simulator S
works as follows.
1. When initialized with security parameter λ, S first runs the key-generation
algorithms of the dual-mode commitment scheme E three times, and obtains
the key pairs (ckH, tk) ← E .KeyGenH(1λ), (ckB, xk) ← E .KeyGenB(1λ) and
(ck′H, tk
′)← E .KeyGenH(1λ).
2. The simulator also chooses a “dummy password” pw′ at random for the
simulated copy of the honest party P1.
3. S initializes the real-world adversary A, giving it the pair (ck, ck′) = (ckB, ck′H)
as the common reference string. Thereafter, S interacts with the ideal
functionality FpwKE and its subroutine A. (Essentially, S uses ck′ = ck′H for
its commitments and A uses ck = ckB for its commitments. See details in
Step 5 right below.)
4. This interaction is implemented by the simulator S just following the protocol
Π on behalf of the honest party, except for the following modifications:
(a) S runs an equivalent EPR-pair version of the protocol, where it creates k
EPR pairs (|00〉+ |11〉) /√2, sends one qubit in each pair to the adversary
A and keeps the others in the register A.
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(b) For each commitment (c0i , c
1
i ) received from the simulated adversary A,
S uses the trapdoor information xk to extract A’s committed values xˆ
and θˆ. It then uses the commitment key ckH to re-commit these values.
(c) Instead of measuring its qubits in T1 in its basis θ|T1 , S measures them
in A’s basis θˆ|T1 . However, it still verifies only whether xˆi = xi for those
i ∈ T ′1 =
{
i ∈ T1 | θi = θˆi
}
. Because the positions i ∈ T1 with θi 6= θˆi
are not used in the protocol at all, this change has no effect.
(d) In the commitment phase, S commits to x = 0(1−α)k, and commits to θ
honestly. It measures the qubits within set T2 upon receiving flow− two2,
then, in the open phase, to open as an arbitrary (x|T2 , θ|T2), the simulator
just uses the trapdoor information tk′ to equivocate.
(e) S measures all the remaining qubits in A’s basis θˆ|T¯ after the flow-two.
(f) Upon receiving ϕˆ from A, it attempts to decode pw∗ from c(pw) = θˆ|T¯⊕ϕˆ.
If this succeeds, it sets pw′ equal to pw∗ and uses pw′ in a TestPwd query
to FpwKE. If this is a “correct guess”, S replaces the dummy password
pw′ with the correct password pw∗.
(g) It sends a random value ϕ ∈ {0, 1}n to A, and proceeds with the simula-
tion.
5. S outputs whatever A outputs, except it replaces A’s commitments with its
own ones in Step 4b.
Proof of Indistinguishability. Similarly to the proof of indistinguishability of the
case when the client is corrupted, we have that if pw′ is a correct guess, then the
simulation is perfect. Otherwise, by using the same argument, we have
Hε∞ (XW |ZE) ≥
(γ
2
− ε− 2h(τ + ε)
)
n.
Here, we upper bound δ
(
ρKP1WW ′ZE|W ′ 6=W , ρW↔W ′↔ZE|W ′ 6=W
)
only by
privacy amplification. In particular, we have
ρKP1WW ′ZE|W ′ 6=W ≈µ ρW↔W ′↔ZE|W ′ 6=W
=
1
2λ
1⊗ ρW↔W ′↔ZE|W ′ 6=W ,
where the approximation follows from privacy amplification, and the exact
equality comes from the independency of W , which, when conditioned on W ′ 6=
W , translates to independency given W ′. The claim follows with µ = 2ε +
2−
1
2 ((
γ
2−ε−2h(τ+ε))n−λ).
